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STATUTES OF LIMITATION FOR RULE 10b-5
Congress granted the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
the authority to promulgate rules under section 10(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934' ('34 Act). Pursuant to the authority, the SEC in
1942 promulgated rule 10b-5.' Congress originally intended the SEC to
have exclusive authority to enforce section 10(b) and any rules pro-
mulgated under section 10(b).' Nonetheless, in 1946 the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania found an implied
private cause of action under section 10(b) and rule 10b-5.1 Because Con-
gress did not foresee a section 10(b) private cause of action before
passage of the '34 Act,5 the '34 Act does not provide a statute of limita-
tions applicable to private suits brought under section 10(b) or rule
10b-5."
To determine limitation periods in federal actions where Congress
1 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1976). Section 1.0(b) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 ('34
Act) provides that use of any manipulative or deceptive device in connection with the pur-
chase or sale of any nationally registered security is unlawful. Id. Section 10(b) liability re-
quires that the device or contrivance be iif contravention of the rules and regulations
prescribed by the SEC for protection of investors. Id.; see Comment, Statutes of Limita-
tions in lOb-5 Actions: A Proposal for CongreSsional Legislation, 24 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1154,
1154-56 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Proposal fqr Congressional Legislation].
2 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1981). The Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) pro-
mulgated rule 10b5 as a cateh.-all fraud provision to supplement other antifraud provisions
scattered throughout the Securities Act bf fg33 ('33 Act) and the '34 Act. See A. BROMBERG,
SECURITIES LAWS: FRAUD-SEC RULE 10b-5, §-2.2, at 19-29 (1969) [hereinafter cited as A.
BROMBERG] (10b-5 fills gap in otherwise coibprehensive congressional antifraud rules); Pro-
posalfor Congressional.Legislation, supra note 1, at 1156 & nn. 13-16.
' See Doret &. Fiebach, .4 Quarter Century Later-The Period of Limitations for
Rule 10b-5 Damage Action In Federal Courts Sitting in Pennsylvania, 25 VILL. L. REV. 851,
852 (1980) (lack of congressional' foresight. of private remedy caused no 10b-5 statute of
limitations) [hereinafter cited as Doret & Fiebach]; Schulman, Statute of Limitation in 10b-5
Actions: Complication Added to Confusion, 13 WAYNE L. REV. 635, 635-37 (1967) [hereinafter
cited as Schulman].
Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512, 514 (E.D. Pa. 1946); cf. Fischman v.
Raytheon Manufacturing Co., 188 F.2d 783, 787 (2d Cir. 1951) (implying civil remedy under
rule 10b-5). In Kardon, where plaintiffs sold stock to corporate insider defendants, the court
noted that the general purpose of the '34 Act was to regulate all transactions involving
securities. 69 F. Supp. at 514. The court held that the mere omission of an express civil
liability provision for violations of § 10(b) should not thwart the prohibitive purpose of the
section. Id. The court thus implied a private right of action for damages under § 10(b) and
rule 10b-5. Id.; see Comment, Securities Regulation: Statute of Limitations Applicable to
10b-5 Actions Arising inPennsylvania, 53 TEMPLE L.Q. 70, 70 n.3 (1980) [hereinafter cited as
lOb-5 Actions Arising in Pennsylvania].
See Schulman, supra note 3, at 649; note 3 supra.
See, e.g., Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 210 n.29 (1976); 5 A. JACOBS,
THE IMPACT OF RULE 10b-5 § 235.02, at 10-5 (1980) [hereinafter cited as A. JACOBS]; Martin,
Statutes of Limitation in 10b-5 Actions: Which State Statute is Applicable?, 29 Bus. LAW.
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has not provided a limitation period, federal courts historically have
looked to the most analogous law of the forum state.7 Thus, in 10b-5 ac-
tions, federal courts generally look to the forum state8 to determine
which state limitation period will give best effect to a rule 10b-5 action?
Because state statutory limitation periods vary greatly, federal
securities law regarding 10b-5 limitation periods currently consists of a
patchwork of different rules resulting from various rationales."0
To determine the limitation period of a 10b-5 action, federal courts
usually choose between the forum state's statute of limitations for com-
mon law fraud and the securities fraud limitation period in the forum's
blue sky law." Most federal courts examine the state statutes in ques-
443, 443 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Martin]; Note, The Defective Private Offering: A Com-
parison of Purchasers'Remedies, 62 IowA L. REV. 236, 265 (1976). No statute of limitation
bars an SEC enforcement proceeding for § 10(b) and rule 10b-5 actions. See Martinet,
Statutes of Limitations on SEC Enforcement Proceeding, 41 VA. L. REV. 59, 59 (1955)
[hereinafter cited as Martinet].
Although private recovery under rule 10b-5 is an implied remedy and the rule thus con-
tains no express affirmative defenses, courts have identified various defenses, including the
statute of limitations defense. See, e.g., Parrent v. Midwest Rug Mills, Inc., 455 F.2d 123,
125 (7th Cir. 1972) (Illinois as forum state provides appropriate limitation period for 10b-5 ac-
tion); Mitchell v. Texas Gulf Sulphur, 446 F.2d 90, 103 (10th Cir. 1971) (Utah as forum state
supplies limitation period); A. JACOBS, supra note 6, at § 234 (general discussion of affirmative
defenses). In addition to the statute of limitation defense, other affirmative defenses to rule
10b-5 include laches, waiver, estoppel, ratification, in pari delicto (equal fault), unclean
hands, res judicata and collateral estoppel. See id., at 10-1.
See, e.g., UAW v. Hoosier Cardinal Crop., 383 U.S. 696, 704 (1966) (state limitation
period applies when Congress has provided no uniform period under National Labor Rela-
tions Act); Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392, 395 (1946) (in absence of federal limitations
period, forum state statute of limitation applies); Roberts v. Magnetic Metals Co., 611 F.2d
450, 456 (3d Cir. 1979) (Sloviter, J., concurring); Charney v. Thomas, 372 F.2d 97, 100 (6th
Cir. 1967) (interpreting UA W as mandate to look to forum state for 10b-5 limitation period);
Schulman, supra note 3, at 640-41, 649 n.74 (discussion of UA W and Charney).
The forum state is the state where the court in which the action is brought sits.
See Doret & Fiebach, supra note 3, at 852-53 & n.12 (federal courts "absorb" limita-
tion period from forum state); note 7 supra. The 1976 U.S. Supreme Court decision in Ernst
& Ernst v. Hochfelder confirmed that courts should look to the forum state's law for the ap-
plicable 10b-5 limitation period. 425 U.S. 185, 210 n.29 (1976); cf. note 50 infra.
"I See, e.g., A. JACOBS, supra note 6, at 10-14 to 10-15 (different court tests); Barton &
Block, Securities Litigation-Statute of Limitations in Private Actions Under Section
10(b)-A Proposal for Achieving Uniformity, 7 SEC. REG. L.J. 374, 375 (1980) (wide
disparities in federal law of 10b-5 limitation periods) [hereinafter cited as Barton & Block];
10b-5 Actions Arising in Pennsylvania, supra note 4, at 71 (considerable disagreement as to
which state limitation period to choose); notes 42-130 infra.
11 See text accompanying notes 16 and 32-44 infra. Common law fraud periods generally
range from 1 to 6 years and average 4 years from discovery. See A. JACOBS, supra note 6, at
10-15 & n.42 to 10-20; Martin, supra note 6, at 446 n.28; Schulman, supra note 3, at 642 n.42
(state fraud limitation periods average 4 years). In some states, courts examine statutes
other than common law fraud or blue sky statutes. These statutes include catch-all provisions,
trespass statutes, and statutes for action on the case. See A. JACOBS, supra note 6, at 10-15 &
nn.42-46.
Blue sky laws, enacted in every state, are state securities laws analogous in many
1022 [Vol. 39:1021
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tion for similarities with rule lOb-5.12 In decisions searching only for the
state statute most similar to rule lOb-5, either the court compares the
substantive elements of the two state statutes to find the closest
resemblance to rule lOb-5,13 or the court looks for the state statute most
common in purpose with lOb-5, usually the blue sky statute.14 Other
respects to the federal securities laws. See 10b-5 Actions Arising in Pennsylvania, supra
note 4, at 71 n.9. Although federal securities laws focus on disclosure, state blue sky laws
often focus on fairness. Blue sky law limitation periods typically average 2 years from sale
and are generally of shorter duration than the state's corresponding common law fraud
statute. See Doret & Fiebach, supra note 3, at 854 n.19; Martin supra note 6, at 446 & n.28;
Cf. UNIFORM SECURITIES ACT § 410(e) (providing no person may sue after 2 years from con-
tract of sale).
The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York first addressed
the issue of the applicable statute of limitations under section 10(b) in 1949, and the Second
Circuit in 1951 was the first court of appeals to consider the statute of limitations question.
See Fischman v. Raytheon Manufacturing Co., 188 F.2d 783, 787 (2d Cir. 1951) (New York's
6-year fraud statute of limitations applied to 10b-5 cause of action); Osborne v. Mallory, 86 F.
Supp. 869, 879 (S.D.N.Y. 1949) (New York's 6-year fraud statute of limitations applied to
10b-5 cause of action); Martin, supra note 6, at 443-44 (discussion of Fischman). Two years
later and for the first time, a federal court chose between two state statutes to determine
the appropriate limitation period for the § 10(b) action. See Fratt v. Robinson, 203 F.2d 627,
634-35 (9th Cir. 1953) (rejecting Washington's 2-year statute of limitations for liabilities
created by statute in favor of 3-year fraud statute); Martin, supra note 6, at 445; cf. Dack v.
Shanman, 227 F. Supp. 26, 29 (S.D.N.Y. 1964) (preferring New York's statute of limitations
for liabilities created by statute instead of fraud statute of same length). The Fratt court
treated the rule 10b-5 cause of action as an action arising under common law, not under
statute. 203 F.2d at 635. The action was for fraud and therefore the court determined a
fraud limitation period should apply regardless of whether the cause of action was embodied
in a federal statute. Id. Since Fratt, federal courts have chosen between state statutes for
the 10b-5 limitation period in every circuit court and in most district courts. See, e.g., For-
restal Village, Inc. v. Graham, 551 F.2d 411, 414 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (applying District of Colum-
bia blue sky statute); Fox v. Kane-Miller Corp., 542 F.2d 915, 918 (4th Cir. 1976) (applying
Maryland blue sky statute); Berry Petroleum Co. v. Adamas & Peck, 518 F.2d 402, 407 (2d
Cir. 1975) (applying Texas blue sky statute through New York borrowing statute); Clegg v.
Conk, 507 F.2d 1351, 1353 (10th Cir. 1974); cert. denied 422 U.S. 1007 (1975) (applying Utah
fraud statute).
12 See, e.g., Wood v. Combustion Engineering, Inc., 643 F.2d 339, 344-45 (5th Cir. 1981)
(Texas fraud statute bears closer substantive resemblance to rule 10b-5 than Texas blue sky
law); Berry Petroleum Co. v. Adams & Peck, 518 F.2d 402, 407 (2d Cir. 1975) (applying
statute of limitation applicable to state cause of action most similar to federal cause of ac-
tion under rule 10b-5); Vanderboom v. Sexton, 422 F.2d 1233, 1237-38 (8th Cir. 1970) (apply-
ing local statute bearing closest resemblance to § 10(b) and rule 10b-5), cert. denied 400 U.S.
852 (1971); text accompanying notes 13-14 and 27-39 infra.
13 See, e.g., O'Hara v. Kovens, 625 F.2d 15, 17-18 (4th Cir. 1980) (Maryland's blue sky
law proscribed behavior challenged under § 10(b)), cert. denied 449 U.S. 1124 (1981); Fox v.
Kane-Miller Corp., 542 F.2d 915, 918 (4th Cir. 1976) (Virginia blue sky law proscribed same
conduct as § 10(b)); Parrent v. Midwest Rug Mills, Inc., 455 F.2d 123, 126 (7th Cir. 1972) (com-
monality of purpose between Illinois securities laws and § 10(b)). Some courts, particularly
when choosing the blue sky law, have used both rationales: commonality of purpose and
closest substantive resemblance to rule 10b-5. See Vanderboom v. Sexton, 422 F.2d 1233,
1237-40 (8th Cir. 1970).
"4 See, e.g., Wood v. Combustion Engineering, Inc., 643 F.2d 339, 345-46 (5th Cir.'1981)
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courts insist on choosing the statute which best effects the remedial
federal policy of providing longer statutes of limitations. 5 Often the
federal policy rationale similarly accompanies a comparison of the state
statutes with rule 10b-5 when the comparison bolsters the choice of the
longer statutory common law fraud limitation period."
In addition to determining which limitation period should apply,
federal courts must determine when the limitation period should start to
run. While the state law provides the length of the limitation period,
federal law determines when that period begins. 7 The federal or
equitable tolling doctrine requires courts to toll the limitation period un-
til the plaintiff discovers or reasonably should have discovered the fraud
or violation.18 The federal tolling doctrine, however, is only one of two
elements necessary to determine when the limitation period begins to
(comparison of Texas blue sky law with Texas fraud statute); Carothers v. Rice, 633 F.2d 7
(6th Cir. 1980) (examination of Kentucky blue sky and fraud statutes), cert denied 450 U.S.
998 (1981); McNeal v. Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc., 598 F.2d 888, 892 & n.9, 893 &
n.10, 894-95 (4th Cir. 1979) (analysis of Georgia blue sky and fraud statutes). When a court
analyzes a state statute for resemblance to rule 10b-5, the court focuses on the provision in
the statute which creates liability, rather than the section of the statute prescribing the
limitation period. E.g., Roberts v. Magnetic Metals Co., 611 F.2d 450, 453 (3d Cir. 1979)
(subsection of New Jersey Uniform Securities Act creating liability for sellers of stock is dif-
ferent from subsection establishing 2-year time-bar applicable to liability section). Once the
court determines, for example, that the state blue sky statute which expressly creates
liability most closely resembles rule 10b-5, then the court will apply the limitation period
corresponding to the blue sky's liability section. E.g., White v. Sanders, 650 F.2d 627, 629 &
n.3, 630-33 (5th Cir. 1981) (examining ALA. CODE § 8-6-19(e)).
11 See, e.g., IDS Progressive Fund, Inc. v. First of Michigan Corp., 533 F.2d 340, 344
(6th Cir. 1976) (broad remedial policies of federal securities laws are best served by longer
statute of limitation); Berry Petroleum Co. v. Adams & Peck, 518 F.2d 402, 409 (2d Cir. 1975)
(same); United California Bank v. Salik, 481 F.2d 1012, 1015 (9th Cir.), cert. denied 414 U.S.
1004 (1973).
" See United California Bank v. Salik, 481 F.2d 1012, 1013 & n.1, 1014 & n.2 (9th Cir.
1973) (applying California fraud statute). In addition to the remedial policies of federal
securities laws favoring longer statutes of limitation, courts also support the choice of com-
mon law fraud periods because changes in the law favoring newer blue sky statutes
arguably would add unnecessary uncertainty to the law. See id. at 1015.
17 See A. JACOBS, supra note 6, at 10-21 to 10-24 (discussion of questions of federal ver-
sus state law); Schulman, supra note 3, at 640 (interpretation of state statutes of limitation
is question of state law); Proposal for Congressional Legislation, supra note 1, at 1162
(same). In applying the federal tolling doctrine, courts have not settled the issue whether
federal or state law should determine when the plaintiff discovered or should have
discovered the fraud. See A. JACOBS, supra note 6, at 10-24; note 11 supra. Compare Janigan
v. Taylor, 344 F.2d 781, 783-84 (1st Cir.), cert. denied 382 U.S. 879 (1965) (where state
statutory period commenced at date of transaction, court adopted only time period from
state statute) with Klein v. Shields & Co., 470 F.2d 1344, 1346-47 (2d Cir. 1972) (state law
controlled determination of when plaintiff discovered fraud where state statutory period
commenced at discovery of fraud).
18 See Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392, 396 (1946) (establishing tolling doctrine);
Berry Petroleum Co. v. Adams & Peck, 518 F.2d 402, 409-11 (2d Cir. 1975) (Texas blue sky
statute of limitation runs from time plaintiff should have discovered fraudulent scheme);
Martin, supra note 6, at 444 (discussion of tolling doctrine); Schulman, supra note 3, at 639 &
n.26; Proposal for Congressional Legislation, supra note 1, at 1160 (discussion of Holmberg);
1024 [Vol. 39:1021
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run in a 10b-5 action.'9 The other element is when the 10b-5 cause of ac-
tion accrues. Accrual is the earliest time for the period to start.
Although state law determines when the cause of action accrues, federal
law determines if the 10b-5 claim has accrued according to the provisions
of the state law in question.2 ° In New York, for example, accrual is when
the plaintiff first is entitled to bring suit.21 Using New York terms,
federal law would determine at what point the rule 10b-5 plaintiff first
became entitled to sue under rule 10b-5." At this point, the limitation
period would begin to run, unless tolled by the federal tolling doctrine.2
If the plaintiff knew or should have known of the fraud later than the ac-
crual of the rule 10b-5 cause of action, then the federal tolling doctrine
would delay the running of the limitation period accordingly.
24
When a federal court has chosen the shorter limitation period, the
federal tolling doctrine helps to explain why the court disregarded the
federal policy for providing longer limitation periods in federal actions.'
A short limitation period will have the same effect as a longer period if
the federal court applies the tolling doctrine to the shorter limitation
period. The federal tolling doctrine, therefore, may counterbalance the
choice of a shorter limitation period, since the doctrine delays all time
periods.6
The current trend in the federal circuit courts is to choose the state
blue sky law over the state common law fraud statute.
2' The Fourth,'28
Sixth,'9 Seventh, 0 Eighth" and District of Columbia 3' Circuits favor the
text accompanying notes 17-24 infra. See generally A. JACOBS, supra note 6, at 10-23 to
10-35; Martin, supra note 6, at 452-54. While the limitation period does not start to run
under the federal tolling doctrine, the doctrine does not operate to stop the period once run-
ning. See A. JACOBS, supra note 6, at 10-36. Other events not only may toll the commence-
ment of the period but also may stop the period from running once the period has started to
run, in which case the period stops running for the duration of the event. See id. Included in
these events are a filing of a class action until the class becomes certified, certain suits
brought by a trustee in bankruptcy, and the signing of tolling agreements where parties
agree to extend the limitation period. See id. at 10-37.
" See A. JACOBS, supra note 6, at 10-22 to 10-24; text accompanying notes 19-24 infra.
20 See A. JACOBS, supra note 6, at 10-22.
21 See id.
I See id.
23 See id. at 10-22 to 10-24.
1 E.g., Morris v. Stifel, Nicolaus & Co., Inc., 600 F.2d 139, 145-46 (8th Cir. 1979)
(equitable tolling doctrine mitigates effect of shorter limitation period); text accompanying
note 26 supra.
" See text accompanying notes 17-18 & 25 supra.
" See Wachovia Bank & Trust v. National Student Marketing, 650 F.2d 342, 346 (D.C.
Cir. 1980) (trend for federal courts to apply blue sky law for 10b-5 limitation period) cert.
denied 452 U.S. 954 (1981); Parrent v. Midwest Rug Mills, Inc., 455 F.2d 123, 124 n.4 (7th Cir.
1972); text accompanying note 66 infra.
20 See text accompanying notes 68-73 infra.
2 See text accompanying notes 74-81 infra.
20 See text accompanying notes 59-61 infra.
21 See text accompanying notes 40-50 infra.
" See text accompanying notes 60-66 infra.
1982] 1025
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typically shorter blue sky limitation periods. The Second, 3  Ninth' and
Tenth35 Circuits, however, prefer the longer common law fraud periods.
The Third Circuit has applied the common law fraud limitation period
3
1
but, like the First Circuit, 37 has not squarely addressed the 10b-5 statute
of limitation question.3 ' Finally, the Fifth Circuit has addressed the issue
squarely, but has produced inconsistent results among the different
states in the circuit. 9
I. CIRCUIT COURTS FAVORING BLUE SKY LIMITATION PERIODS
The Eighth Circuit was a forerunner in supporting blue sky limita-
tion periods for 10b-5 actions." In Vanderboom v. Sexton,41 the Eighth
Circuit decided that the appropriate standard for selecting the 10b-5
statute of limitations period was the state statute which best served the
federal policy involved.2 The court accordingly proposed a resemblance
test to determine which state statute most closely comports with the
federal policy underlying a 10b-5 cause of action." The two-pronged
Vanderboom test looks to the state statute bearing the closest
resemblance to the federal statute at issue.44 The first prong of the test
establishes which state statute more closely coincides with the underly-
ing purpose of 10b-5.4" The second prong compares the substantive
defenses in the state statutes with the defenses available in rule 10b-5
actions.46 Applying the test, the Vanderboom court found that Arkansas'
blue sky statute47 shared a commonality of purpose with section 10(b).48
See text accompanying notes 98-108 infra.
s See text accompanying notes 92-98 infra.
See text accompanying notes 92-98 infra.
3' See text accompanying notes 111-112 infra.
See text accompanying note 109 infra.
See text accompanying notes 110, 113-18 infra.
See text accompanying notes 119-30 infra.
40 See Vanderboom v. Sexton, 442 F.2d 1233, 1240 (8th Cir. 1970); Martin, supra note 6,
at 447-8; Proposal for Congressional Legislation, supra note 1, at 1161; text accompanying
notes 41-51 infra.
4 442 F.2d 1233 (8th Cir. 1970).
" 422 F.2d at 1237; cf. Charney v. Thomas, 372 F.2d 97, 100 (6th Cir. 1967) (applying
federal policy language to choice of fraud limitation period); Martin, supra note 6, at 447
(comparison of Charney with Vanderboom).
"s 422 F.2d at 1237-38. In Vanderboom, the plaintiffs purchased securities and alleged
that defendant sellers and others fraudulently induced the plaintiffs to invest. See id. at
1235-36. The court held that the blue sky limitation period applied to 10b-5 actions and
remanded for determination of whether the two-year limitation period barred the action.
See id. at 1243.
:4 Id. at 1237-38.
4 Id. at 1239-40.
46 Id. at 1240. The Vanderboom court noted that scienter was not required in 10b-5 ac-
tions, while the fraud statute did require scienter. Id. at 1238-39; see note 50 infra.
'7 See ARK. STAT. ANN. § 67-1256(e) (Replacement 1962) (2 year blue sky period).
, 422 F.2d at 1237, 1239-40. The Vanderboom court analogized a rule 10b-5 action to an
[Vol. 39:1021
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The court also found that the Arkansas common law fraud statute49 did
not create substantially the same defenses as did rule 10b-5.10
In Parrent v. Midwest Rug Mills, Inc.," the Seventh Circuit, citing
implied federal blue sky cause of action. Id. at 1237. Therefore, the court held the blue sky
law the most logical statute to provide a limitation period in rule 10b-5 actions. Id.
" See 422 F.2d at 1237; ARK. STAT. ANN. § 37-206 (Replacement 1962) (3-year limitation
period applying to actions founded on contract or other liability). Arkansas courts have ap-
plied section 37-206 as the limitation period for common law fraud actions. See 442 F.2d at
1237.
- See 422 F.2d at 1238-39; cf. Morris v. Stifel, Nicolaus & Co., 600 F.2d 139, 144 (8th
Cir. 1979) (diminishing importance of Vanderboom's 'similarity of defenses' factor).
Since the Vanderboom decision was a pre-Hochfelder case, rule 10b-5, like the Arkan-
sas blue sky statute, required no element of scienter. See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425
U.S. 185, 193 (1976) (scienter is required for liability in private action for damages brought
under rule 10b-5); Morris v. Stifel, Nicolaus & Co., Inc., 600 F.2d 139, 142-44 (8th Cir. 1979).
Thus, the second prong of Vanderboom's test was satisfied. The Eighth Circuit recently
reaffirmed the support for the Vanderboom resemblance test in view of the Hochfelder
scienter requirement of rule 10b-5. See Morris v. Stifel, Nicolaus & Co., Inc., 600 F.2d 139
(8th Cir. 1979). In Morris, the Eighth Circuit decided that Missouri's two-year blue sky
limitation period, and not the five-year common law fraud period applied to 10b-5 actions
even though the Missouri blue sky law does not require scienter. Id. at 143 n.10, 146 (no
scienter requirement in Missouri blue sky law); Mo. REV. STAT. § 409.411(a)(2) (1969) (blue
sky law); id. § 409.411(e) (1969) (blue sky limitation period); id. § 516.120 (1969) (common law
fraud limitation period); cf. Buder v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 644 F.2d
690, 692 (8th Cir. 1981) (applying without discussion 2-year blue sky period to rule 10b-5 ac-
tion); Garnatz v. Stifel, Nicolaus & Co., Inc., 559 F.2d 1357, 1363 (8th Cir. 1977) (not deciding
which limitation period applies since longest would bar action but confirming general rule to
apply blue sky period to 10b-5 actions), cert. denied 435 U.S. 951 (1978). Noting that the test
survives Hochfelder's additional requirement of scienter in rule 10b-5 actions, the Circuit
held that the two prongs of the test are not conjunctive prerequisites but should weigh
together. 600 F.2d at 142, 144. Moreover, as long as the blue sky law is substantially con-
gruent with rule 10b-5, the commonality of purpose factor outweighs any variance in
defenses, and the second Vanderboom prong is a secondary factor. Id. at 144. Although the
Eighth Circuit has not decided the issue in four states within the Circuit, the Morris decision
supports the expectation that the Eighth Circuit will apply the blue sky period to 10b-5 ac-
tions. See id. at 142-145. The Eighth Circuit has not decided the 10b-5 limitation issue in
Minnesota, Nebraska, North Dakota and South Dakota. See A. JACOBS, supra note 6, at
10-17 to 10-19; cf. Bailey v. Piper, Jaffrey & Hopwood, Inc., 414 F. Supp. 475, 479-84 (D.
Minn. 1976) (applying three year blue sky law).
InAlodex CorporationSecuritiesLitigation (Alodex, the Eighth Circuit in 1976 followed
the Vanderboom resemblance test for commonality of purpose and similarity of defenses
with rule 10b-5 to apply Iowa's two year's blue sky period to rule 10b-5 action. See 533 F.2d
372, 372-74 (8th Cir. 1976); IowA CODE § 502.23 (1975). The court found a commonality of pur-
pose between the blue sky law and rule 10b-5 since both provisions expressly dealt with
securities sales. See 533 F.2d at 373. The court also examined the defenses allowed in the
state statutes to determine the closest analogue to rule 10b-5. See id. at 373-74. As in
Vanderboom, the Alodex court found the second requirement satisfied because the Iowa
blue sky laws and rule 10b-5 did not require scienter at the time of the decisions. See 533
F.2d at 373-74; note 46 supra.
11 455 F.2d 123 (7th Cir. 1972). In Parrent, plaintiffs were purchasers of stock who
alleged that two defendant corporations fraudulently induced plaintiffs to buy stock. See id.
at 124. The Parrent court held the applicable limitation period barred the federal securities
claims. Id. at 130.
102719821
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the Eighth Circuit Vanderboom approach, examined Illinois statutes for
commonality of purpose with rule 10b-5. 2 The Parrent court found that
the Illinois blue sky law more closely resembled rule 10b-5 than the
statutory common law fraud period.5 3 The court reasoned that the three-
year blue sky period54 was closer to express limitation periods provided
in other federal securities law than was the five-year fraud period. 5 The
Parrent court additionally noted that the choice of a state security law
not only promotes a more orderly development of the law56 but also best
effects the federal policy of protecting the uninformed and gullible. 7
Since the Parrent decision, the Seventh Circuit has applied the blue sky
period for 10b-5 actions in each state within the Circuit. 8 The Seventh
Circuit thus has firmly established itself as a "blue sky" jurisdiction.
Like the Seventh Circuit, the District of Columbia Circuit applies a
blue sky limitation period to 10b-5 actions. 0 In Forrestal Village, Inc. v.
Graham,1 the circuit emphasized similarities in purpose and substance
52 See 455 F.2d at 126-27; Vanderboom v. Sexton, 422 F.2d 1233 (8th Cir. 1970).
455 F.2d at 127; see ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 121-1/2, § 137.13 (3-year blue sky period). The
Parrent court found that the Illinois blue sky law more closely resembled rule 10b-5 even
though the blue sky law, unlike the rule 10b-5, provided no remedy for buyers. See 455 F.2d
at 126 n.7.
See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 121-1/2, § 137.13.
455 F.2d at 125 n.3 127; ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 83, § 16 (5-year common law fraud period).
See 455 F.2d at 127.
See id. at 126. Relying on Parrent, the Seventh Circuit in 1979 again held the three
year blue sky period applicable to 10b-5 actions brought in Illinois. See Memkov v. O'Hare
Chicago Corp., 592 F.2d 351, 355 (7th Cir. 1979) (applying blue sky period to 10b-5 action); cf.
Baselski v. Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, 514 F. Supp. 535, 539 (N.D. Ill. 1981) (parties to
10b-5 action agreeing on Parrent as authority for applicability of 3-year Illinois limitation
period).
I See Cahill v. Ernst & Ernst, 625 F.2d 151, 156 (7th Cir. 1980); LaRosa Corp. v.
Equitable Life Assurance Society, 542 F.2d 990, 993 (7th Cir. 1976). In LaRosa, a defrauded
seller sought damages against defendant corporation for fraudulent conduct in connection
with causing the plaintiff to absorb i 25% share of partnership operating losses. See 542
F.2d at 990. The Seventh Circuit held that the 2-year blue sky period applied to sellers as
well as purchasers, and that the 6-year fraud statute was not applicable. Id. at 993; see IND.
CODE §§ 23-2-1-19(e) (blue sky period), 34-1-2-1 (fraud period). In LaRosa, the action by the
seller accrued in 1970. See 542 F.2d at 990. The legislature amended the blue sky law in
1975 to provide a remedy for the seller. See id.; IND. CODE § 23-2-1-19(b).
Plaintiff in Cahill was a purchaser who alleged that the defendant accounting firm
made false representations of financial status before the purchase of securities. See 625
F.2d at 152. The Seventh Circuit chose the Wisconsin blue sky period over both the 6-year
common law fraud period and the 6-year catch-all period. See id. at 154; Wis. STAT. §§
551.59(5) (blue sky law specifically providing that statute of limitation runs after earlier of
one year following discovery of violation or three years after the act or transaction con-
stituting violation), 893.19(7) (common law period), 893.14(4) (catch-all period).
" See Block & Barton, supra note 10, at 375 & n.11, 376, text accompanying notes 51-58
supra.
I See Forrestal Village, Inc. v. Graham, 551 F.2d 411, 413-14 (D.C. Cir. 1977); text ac-
companying notes 61-64 infra.
11 551 F.2d 411 (D.C. Cir. 1977). In Forrestal Village, Inc., the plaintiff buyer of
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between the District of Columbia blue sky law and rule 10b-5.2' The court
reasoned that both provisions regulate or control the sale of securities in
particular, rather than fraud in general.63 In view of the commonality of
purpose between the District of Columbia blue sky law and section 10(b),
therefore, the District of Columbia Circuit applied the blue sky period. 4
Moreover, a recent District of Columbia Circuit decision65 has affirmed
that the circuit now follows the rule in Forrestal Village, Inc. to apply
blue sky limitation periods to 10b-5 actiong.66
The Fourth Circuit also has focused on the commonality of purpose
factor in choosing the blue sky period for rule 10b-5 actions. 7 In 0 'Hara
v. Kovens,6 the Fourth Circuit upheld the application of Maryland's blue
sky limitation period69 in a 10b-5 action brought by defrauded sellers of
securities."0 The court held that the blue sky statute proscribed the
securities sued a seller of securities for violations of § 10(b) and rule 10b-5. See id. at 414.
The D.C. Circuit adopted the Eighth Circuit's reasoning in Vanderboom v. Sexton and af-
firmed the district court's holding that blue sky law period applied to the federal action. See
id.; 422 F.2d 1233, 1237 (8th Cir. 1970); text accompanying notes 41-46 supra.
62 See 551 F.2d at 414.
' See id.
See id. at 413-14; D.C. CODE ANN. § 2-2413 (1973) (2-year blue sky period). The For-
restal Village, Inc. v. Graham court refused to follow the Ninth and Tenth Circuit reasoning
favoring longer limitation period and thus rejected the District of Columbia's 3-year fraud
limitation period. See 551 F.2d at 413-14; D.C. CODE ANN. § 12-301(8) (1973) (3-year fraud
period). The Forrestal Village, Inc. court found unimportant that rule 10b-5 requires
scienter, while the D.C. blue sky law does not require scienter. 551 F.2d at 414; see D.C.
CODE ANN. § 2-2413. In addition to the D.C. blue sky statute's negligence standard, the court
noted that the statute provides a cause of action only for buyers. See 551 F.2d at 414; D.C.
CODE ANN. § 2-2413. The action in Forrestal Village, Inc. involved a plaintiff buyer.
Therefore, the fact that 10b-5 provided a cause of action for both buyers and sellers was im-
material. See 551 F.2d at 441. The D.C. Circuit has not addressed the issue whether D.C.'s
blue sky law will govern a 10b-5 action when the plaintiff has no cause of action under D.C.'s
blue sky laws, See id.
" See Wachovia Bank & Trust v. National Student Marketing, 650 F.2d 343 (D.C. Cir.
1980). In Wachovia Bank & Trust, the plaintiffs were purchasers of newly issued securities
who brought a 10b-5 action against the issuing corporation and others. See id. at 345. The
court examined whether the holding in Forrestal Village, Inc. v. Graham should govern
lOb-5 actions prospectively or retrospectively. See id. at 346. The Tenth Circuit held that
the Forrestal Village, Inc. decision should be applied prospectively only. Id. at 347-48, 359.
Considering the applicability of the federal tolling doctrine, the prospective application of
the Forrestal Village, Inc. decision could possibly have an impact on'current 10b-5 pro-
ceedings, since the court could toll the accrual of a pre-Forrestal Village, Inc. decision. See
text accompanying notes 19-24 supra.
See 650 F.2d at 346.
'7 See text accompanying notes 68-73 infra.
" 625 F.2d 15 (4th Cir. 1980). In Gurley v. Documation, Inc., the Fourth Circuit recently
followed O'Hara v. Kovens by applying Virginia's 2-year blue sky limitation period to a
10b-5 action. Gurley v. Dorumation, Inc., slip. op. No. 81-1684 (March 22, 1982); VA. CODE §
13.1-522(d) (Repl. Vol. 1977). The Gurley court found significant that both rule 10b-5 and the
blue sky law address the problem of misinformation in securities transactions. Slip op. at 16.
' See MD. CORP. & Ass'Ns CDDE ANN. § 11-793(f) (Supp. 1979) (1-year blue sky period).
,0 See 625 F.2d at 18. Significantly, when the O'Hara action accrued, Maryland's blue
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specific behavior challenged in the federal action because the blue sky
law provided criminal sanctions supporting sellers' rights.' Since the
state legislature designed the blue sky law to achieve ends similar to the
purposes of rule 10b-5, the Fourth Circuit reasoned that the blue sky
statute appropriately provided the applicable limitation period. 2 The
O'Hara court found that the commonality of purpose is the overriding
factor, and that the federal and state statutes need not be identical or
even operate in the same fashion.73
Although the Sixth Circuit has traditionally applied the common law
fraud period to rule 10b-5 actions, 4 the circuit recently reversed the
position and followed the trend in other circuits to apply the blue sky
sky laws provided no civil remedy for defrauded sellers. See id. at 17; MD. CORP. & ASS'NS
CODE ANN. § 11-703(a)(2) (Supp. 1979) (blue sky law). Additionally, the blue sky law differed
from rule 10b-5 because the blue sky law did not require scienter. See 625 F.2d at 17; Md.
Corp. & Ass'ns Code Ann. § 11-703(a); cf. White v. Sanders, 650 F.2d 627, 632-33 (5th Cir.,
Unit B 1981) (discussion of O'Hara).
" 625 F.2d at 17-18; see MD. CORP. & ASS'NS CODE ANN. §§ 11-301, -417 (Supp. 1979)
(criminal sanctions); note 72 infra. The O'Hara court examined the blue sky remedies ex-
isting when the action accrued rather than at the time of suit. See 625 F.2d at 17. At the
time of the suit, an amendment to the blue sky law provided a civil remedy for defrauded
sellers. See id.; note 70 supra. The 0'Hara court decided that an amendment of the blue sky
laws after the action accrued but before plaintiffs brought suit would not affect considera-
tion of the statute existing at the time of accrual. See id.; Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. v. Na-
tional Student Marketing Co., 650 F.2d 342, 346-47 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (earlier decision to apply
blue sky statute limitation period nonretroactively); MeNeal v. Paine, Webber, Jackson &
Curtis, Inc., 598 F.2d 888, 892-93 n.9 (5th Cir. 1979) (looking to law existing when cause of ac-
tion accrued). But see LaRosa Building Corp. v. Equitable Life Assurance Society, 542 F.2d
990, 991-993 (7th Cir. 1976) (applying blue sky limitation where amendment of blue sky laws
after plaintiff-seller's cause of action accrued expressly provided remedy for defrauded
sellers); notes 58 supra & 73 infra.
72 625 F.2d at 18.
,s Id. The O'Hara court left open the issue whether the blue sky period should apply to
a federal cause of action when such action if brought in state court would result in no liability
under the blue sky law. See id. at 18 n.3; cf. Roberts v. Magnetic Metals Co., 611 F.2d 450,
453-55 (3d Cir. 1979). In addition to the issues decided in O'Hara, the Fourth Circuit has held
that when the time plaintiffs knew or should have known about defendant's omission is one
year after the legislative shortening of a blue sky limitation period, the revised, shortened
blue sky period applied to the 10b-5 cause of action. Fox v. Kane-Miller, 542 F.2d 915, 917-18
(4th Cir. 1976) (applying Maryland's 1-year blue sky period enacted in 1968 instead of the
prior 2-year period to cause of action accruing in 1969); note 71 supra. See also O'Hara v.
Kovens, 625 F.2d 15, 18 (4th Cir. 1980) (discussion of Fox); Mid-Carolina Oil, Inc., et al v.
Klippel, [1982] FED. SEC L. REP. (CCH) 98,431 (D.S.C. March 19, 1981) (applying South
Carolina's 3-year blue sky law rather than 6-year fraud period); cf. Newman v. Prior, 518
F.2d 97, 100 (4th Cir. 1975) (applying Virginia's 2-year blue sky period of limitation and not
5-year fraud period to cause of action brought under § 17 of the Securities Act of 1933).
11 See, e.g., A. JACOBS, supra note 6, at 10-14 to 10-15 n.42; Martin, supra note 6, at
448-49 & n.46; Proposal for Congressional Legislation, supra note 1, at 1161 & n.45. In IDS
Progressive Fund, Inc. v. First of Michigan Corp., plaintiffs were a class of purchasers who
alleged that the selling corporation misled purchasers by issuance of a prospectus prepared
by the defendant, First of Michigan. See 533 F.2d 340, 342 (6th Cir. 1976). The Sixth Circuit
held that Michigan's six-year common law fraud limitation period, and not the two-year blue
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limitation period. 5 In Carothers v. Rice, 6 the Sixth Circuit applied the
shorter blue sky limitation period in a 10b-5 cause of action brought by
sky period applied to the 10b-5 action. Id. at 344; see MICH. STAT. ANN. §§ 19.776 (blue sky
period), 27A.5813 (common law fraud period).
The IDS Progressive Fund, Inc. court addressed the same issue which the Sixth Cir-
cuit discussed in Charney v. Thomas in 1967. See 533 F.2d at 342; 372 F.2d 97,100 (6th Cir. 1967).
The court in Charney chose the common law fraud period over the blue sky period, because in
1967 the blue sky law did not contain a provision similar to § 10(b). See 372 F.2d at 100.
Since the Michigan legislature repealed the blue sky law examined in Charney, the IDS Pro-
gressive Fund, Inc. court reevaluated the proper choice of state statutes under current blue
sky laws in Michigan. See 533 F.2d at 342-44. In IDS Progressive Fund, Inc., however, the
court found the civil liability under current law to be virtually identical to the civil liability
under the old blue sky laws examined in Charney. See id. at 343 & nn.1-2. The court reasoned
that the new Michigan blue sky law, which contains virtually identical language as in rule
10b-5, carries only criminal liability. See id. at 342-43; MICH. STAT. ANN. § 19.776(101); cf.
MICH. STAT. ANN. § 19.776(410(h)) (criminal liability is exclusive remedy for § 101). The court
therefore found that the blue sky law creating civil liability was not a sufficient analogue to
rule 10b-5. 533 F.2d at 343. The IDS Progressive Fund, Inc. court also reasoned that three
characteristics of the blue sky law differentiated the law from rule 10b-5 actions. See id. Not
only did the blue sky law more narrowly restrict misrepresentations to statements and
omissions, but also the blue sky law limited liability to sellers only. See id.; MIcH. STAT.
ANN. § 19.776(401) (blue sky law). Additionally, the court noted that the Michigan blue sky
law contained an express scienter requirement, where rule 10b-5 had no express scienter re-
quirement. See 533 F.2d at 343; MICH. STAT. ANN. § 19.776(410); cf. Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193 (1976) (scienter is an element of rule 10b-5 action). Moreover,
the court found that any similarities would not warrant adding unnecessary uncertainty to
federal claims by changing the limitation period established by an earlier decision. See 533
F.2d at 343; cf. Oharney v. Thomas, 372 F.2d 97, 100 (6th Cir. 1967).
In a consolidated action, Nickels v. Koehler Management Corp., the first plaintiff was a
former shareholder who alleged fraudulent misrepresentation by the acquiring corporation
in connection with a merger which involved the exchange of stock. See 541 F.2d 611, 612
(6th Cir. 1976), cert denied 429 U.S. 1074 (1977). The other plaintiffs were shareholders of a
merged corporation whose directors recommended the merger, sat on both sides of the
merger, and allegedly withheld important financial information from plaintiffs See id. at
612-13. The Nickels court applied Ohio's four-year common law fraud period rather than
Ohio's two year blue sky limitation period. See id.; OHIo RE V. CODE ANN. §§ 1707.43 (Page)
(blue sky period), 2305.09 (Page) (common law fraud period); cf. id. § 2305.07 (Page) (6-year
period for liability created by statute). After comparison of the blue sky law with the com-
mon law fraud statute, the Nickels court concluded that both statutes had a marked
resemblance to rule 10b-5, but that application of the fraud statute better served the federal
policy of continuing the limitation period applied by the Circuit in an earlier decision. See
541 at 613, 617-18; cf. Connelly v. Balkwill, 279 F.2d 685 (6th Cir. 1960) (affirming choice of
4-year Ohio fraud statute over 6-year statute for liability created by statute).
In addition to the importance of providing a limitation period on which the securities
market can rely, the Sixth Circuit distinguished the 10b-5 action in Nickels as based on com-
mon law fraud theories, and not arising out of the blue sky law substantive provisions. See
541 F.2d at 616. The Nickels court held that the Ohio legislature did not intend the blue sky
laws to apply to all securities law fraud. Id. Therefore, if an action brought in federal court
under rule lOb-5 would be better brought in state court under the common law fraud
statute, the blue sky statutory period would be inappropriate. See id.
, See text accompanying notes 76-81 infra.
633 F.2d 7 (6th Cir. 1980). Alleging that defendant tender offerors made fraudulent
misrepresentations and omissions, the plaintiffs in Carothers sued under § 10(b) and rule
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defrauded sellers." Significantly, the Kentucky blue sky law applied in
Carothers required neither scienter nor reliance and provided no
remedy for sellers.78 The court, however, held that the Kentucky state
courts would imply a remedy for defrauded sellers.79 The court in
Carothers examined Sixth Circuit decisions applying statutory common
law fraud periods in states other than Kentucky and yet held that the
Sixth Circuit was not bound by a desire to avoid increasing uncertainty
in the law. 0 The Carothers court noted that the relaxed requirements of
the blue sky law when compared with rule 10b-5 were not objectionable
for purposes of choosing the limitation period, because a shortened
period compensated for the lack of strict requirements.
II. CIRCUIT COURTS FAVORING COMMON LAW FRAUD
LIMITATION PERIODS
The Ninth Circuit has consistently applied the common law
fraud period to rule 10b-5 actions.82 In United California Bank v.
10b-5 for damages and alternatively, rescission. See id. at 9. The court reversed the lower
court and held the lOb-5 action barred by the three year blue sky statute of limitations. Id.
at 14.
" Id., see Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 292.480(3) (Baldwin) (3-year blue sky period); cf. id. §
413.120(12) (Baldwin) (5-year common law fraud period).
78 See 633 F.2d at 10, 14; Ky. Ray. STAT. ANN. § 292.480(1). In addition to no require-
ment of scienter or reliance, the Kentucky blue sky law differs from 10b-5 because the blue
sky law allows only a plaintiff who has tendered his shares to recover. See 633 F.2d at 10,
14; Ky. Ray. STAT. ANN. § 292.480(1) (blue sky statute).
"9 633 F.2d at 14. The court reasoned that when the Kentucky legislature adopted the
Kentucky blue sky law provisions from the Uniform Securities Act (U.S.A.), the legislature
did not decide to adopt the subsection that prohibited implied remedies. See id. at 10-11.
The court concluded that the legislature must have intended to imply remedies under the
blue sky law to match the implied remedies of rule 10b-5. See 633 F.2d at 11.
633 F.2d at 13.
81 633 F.2d at 14. The court was aware that previously the Sixth Circuit had supported
the federal policy that longer limitation periods best serve federal securities laws. See id. at
14. The reason for this policy, however, is to provide a plaintiff that has a federal claim as
long to sue as has the person with the state claim. Id. Since Kentucky courts held the blue
sky law the exclusive remedy, the choice of the blue sky statute supports the federal policy.
Id.; see Owensboro v. First U.S. Corp., 534 S.W. 2d 789, 791 (Ky. 1975) (blue sky law is ex-
clusive remedy for securities fraud).
The Sixth Circuit followed Carothers in 1981 in Herm v. Stafford, 663 F.2d 669 (6th Cir.
1981), where the court applied the shorter Kentucky blue sky period, holding the three year
period applicable to a purchaser's 10b-5 action brought against the selling corporation that
issued a misleading press release. Id. at 677-78. The Sixth Circuit currently has decided
10b-5 limitation period issues in all states within the Circuit except Tennessee. See Denny
v. Performance Sys. Inc., [1971-72 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. RaEP. (CCH) 1 98,387, at
91,981 (M.D. Tenn. 1971) (10 year limitation period).
8 See text accompanying notes 89-90 infra. Most of the Ninth Circuit decisions dealing
with the 10b-5 limitation period issue have been federal actions brought in California. See,
e.g., Robuck v. Dean Witter & Co., Inc. [1982] FaD. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 98,379, at 92, 295
(9th Cir. 1980); Jablon v. Dean Witter & Co., 614 F.2d 667, 681 (9th Cir. 1980) (applying
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Salik," the Ninth Circuit held that California's common law fraud
period8' governed a 10b-5 action against a seller of securities.85 The court
refused to apply the state's shorter blue sky period88 because such a
change from established Ninth Circuit precedent applying the fraud
period would have added unnecessary uncertainty to the availability of
federal claims. 7 The Salik court also reasoned that the fraud period bet-
ter served the federal remedial policy of providing longer rather than
shorter limitation periods.8 A later Ninth Circuit decision, Robuck .v.
Dean Witter & Co., Inc.,89 applied the California fraud period, reasoning
that the fraud statute substantively resembled rule 10b-5 more closely
than did the blue sky statute. The Ninth Circuit has thus established
itself as a "common law fraud" jurisdiction."
The Tenth Circuit also-has firmly established itself as a "common
law fraud" jurisdiction.2 In Mitchell v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 3 the
Tenth Circuit applied Utah's common law fraud limitation period,' reject-
ing the blue sky period where sellers of stock brought a 10b-5 action
against the issuing corporation.15 The court reasoned that rule 10b-5
California 3-year common law limitation period); Briskin v. Ernst & Ernst, 589 F.2d 1363,
1365 (9th Cir. 1978) (same); Rochelle v. Marine Midland Grace Trust Co., 535 F.2d 523, 531
(9th Cir. 1976) (parties agreeing that 3-year common law fraud period applies); cf. Cameron
v. Adams & Co., 547 F.2d 473, 477 (9th Cir. 1976) (parties agreeing that Oregon's 2-year com-
mon law fraud period applies); Douglass v. Hinton Investments, Inc., 440 F.2d 912, 915-16
(9th Cir. 1971) (applying Washington's 3-year fraud limitation period instead of blue sky
period).
481 F.2d 1012 (9th Cir. 1973). The plaintiffs in Salik purchased shares in a bank pur-
suant to a purchase agreement with defendants, former shareholders of bank stock. See id.
at 1013. The plaintiffs alleged that the bank had undisclosed losses before the purchase
agreement resulting in the insolvency of the bank. See id. The Salik court affirmed the
lower court's holding that the fraud limitation period did not bar the 10b-5 action. See id. at
1013, 1015.
u See CAL. CODE CIv. P. § 338(4).
481 F.2d at 1015.
', See CAL. CORP. CODE § 25506. Section 25506 requires that an action under the blue
sky law be brought one year from discovery of the violative act or four years from the act
itself, whichever expires first. See 481 F.2d at 1013 n.1.
" See 481 F.2d at 1015; Hecht v. Harris, Upham & Co., 430 F.2d 1202, 1210 (9th Cir.
1970); Sackett v. Beaman, 399 F.2d 884, 890 (9th Cir. 1968).
See 481 F.2d at 1015.
See [1982] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 98,379, at 92,295 (9th Cir. 1980). In Robuck v.
Dean Witter & Co., Inc., plaintiff sued his investment advisor after the defendant liquidated
plaintiffs account when plaintiff failed to meet margin calls. See id. at 92,294-95. The court
held that the three year fraud statute of limitations barred the 10b-5 cause of action. Id. at
92,295-96.
90 Id. at 92,295. The Robuck court held that the state fraud action most resembles a
rule 10b-5 action since both the federal and state actions require reckless or intentional con-
duct. Id.
91 See text accompanying notes 82-90 supra.
See Barton & Block, supra note 10, at 376, text accompanying notes 93-98 infra.
,3 446 F.2d 90 (10th Cir. 1971).
" UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-12-26(3) (1953) (3-year common law fraud period).
, 446 F.2d at 104.
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damage actions coalesce with fraud actions.9" Three years after Mitchell,
the Tenth Circuit again rejected Utah's blue sky period as applicable to
a 10b-5 action on the sole ground that the Ninth Circuit has repeatedly
held the longer common law period applicable.97
Virtually all of the Second Circuit cases dealing with 10b-5 statute of
limitation issues accrue in New York. Other Second Circuit cases have
applied New York's "borrowing statute".99 A borrowing statute requires
a court to apply the statute of limitations of the state where the action
accrued if that state's limitation period is shorter than the period of the
forum state. °10 When a 10b-5 action accrues in New York or when the
" See id. The Mitchell court distinguished the Eighth Circuit decision, Vanderboom v.
Sexton, insofar as the Eighth Circuit did not have a scienter requirement for rule 10b-5 ac-
tions. 446 F.2d at 104; see 422 F.2d 1233, 1239 (8th Cir. 1970); text accompanying notes 48-50
supra. Since the Tenth Circuit has long favored requiring scienter in 10b-5 actions, the state
common law fraud action which also required scienter was most analogous to 10b-5. 446 F.2d
at 104. The Mitchell court followed the holding in Chiodo v. General Water Works Corp.
that the common law fraud limitation period controlled private 10b-5 actions. Id.; see 380
F.2d 860, 867 (10th Cir. 1967) (applying Utah common law period).
", See Clegg v. Conk, 507 F.2d 1351, 1352 (10th Cir. 1974), cert. denied 422 U.S. 1007
(1975). In 1980, the Tenth Circuit applied Colorado's three year common law fraud period to
a rule 10b-5 action after holding that suits brought under rule 10b-5 are analogous to state
law fraud actions. Aldrich v. McCulloch Properties, Inc., 627 F.2d 1036, 1041 (10th Cir. 1980);
see deHaas v. Empire Petroleum Co., 435 F.2d 1223, 1225 (10th Cir. 1970) (applying Colorado
fraud limitation period); Layman v. McComb, [1982] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 98,424, at
92,538 (D. Colo. October 19, 1981) (following Aldrich and deHaas when applying Colorado
fraud period in 10b-5 action); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 13-80-108 to -109 (1973) (fraud period).
93 See, e.g., IIT v. Cornfeld, 619 F.2d 909, 928, (2d Cir. 1980) (applying New York com-
mon law fraud period); Phillips v. Levie, 593 F.2d 459, 460-61 (2d Cir. 1979); Stull v. Bayard,
561 F.2d 429, 431-32 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied 434 U.S. 1035 (1978); Klein v. Bower, 421 F.2d
338, 343-44 (2d Cir. 1970).
" NEW YORK CIv. PRAC. § 202 (McKinney 1972); see, e.g., Industrial Consultants, Inc. v.
H. S. Equities, Inc., 646 F.2d 746, 747 (2d Cir.), cerL denied 102 S. Ct. 145 (1981) (borrowing
Oklahoma statute of limitations); Robertson v. Seidman & Seidman, 609 F.2d 583, 586 (2d
Cir. 1979) (borrowing Alaska statute); Arneil v. Ramsey, 550 F.2d 774, 779 (2d Cir. 1977)
(borrowing Washington statute); A. JACOBS, supra note 6, at 10-8 to -9 (1980 ed.); Barton &
Block, supra note 10 at 374-80. But see Berry Petroleum Co. v. Adams & Peck, 518 F.2d 402,
406 (2d Cir. 1975) (applying Texas statute of limitations); text accompanying note 100 infra.
Other states also have enacted borrowing statutes. E.g., Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 413.320
(Baldwin); N.Y. CIv. PRAC. LAW § 202 (McKinney 1972); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5521(b)
(Purdon Supp. 1980).
11 See, e.g., Industrial Consultants, Inc. v. H. S. Equities, 646 F.2d 746, 747 (2d Cir.
1981); A. JACOBS, supra note 6, at 10-8 to 10-9; Barton & Block, supra note 10 at 378. A
typical borrowing statute requires a court to refer to the law of the state where the cause of
action accrued in deciding the proper limitation period. See N.Y. CIv. PRAC. § 202 (McKin-
ney 1972). In Industrial Consultants, Inc. v. H. S. Equities, Inc., an Oklahoma corporation
sued a New York Stock Exchange member firm for false and misleading representations of
financial conditions. 646 F.2d 746, 747 (2d Cir. 1981). Appellant argued that New York's six-
year statute of limitations should apply to the § 10(b) and rule 10b-5 cause of action. Id. The
Second Circuit, however, following Arneil v. Ramsey and Sack v. Low, held that the action
accrues in the state where the plaintiff sustains the loss caused by the misrepresentation.
Id.; see Arneil v. Ramsey, 550 F.2d 774, 779-80 (2d Cir. 1977) (place of economic impact); Sack
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New York borrowing statute does not apply, the Second Circuit has con-
sistently applied New York's common law fraud period, because New
York has no blue sky limitation period.'
In liT v. Cornfeld,'0 ' the Second Circuit defined New York's limita-
tion period applicable to a rule 10b-5 action. 103 The IT court established
that the limitation period for a 10b-5 action governed by New York law
is the longer of six years from the accrual of the cause of action,0 or two
years from when the injured party discovered or should have discovered
the fraud."0 5 Although the lIT court provided no reasoning for the decis-
ion,' 0 an earlier Second Circuit decision applying Texas' blue sky period
through New York's borrowing statute indicates that the Second Circuit
will follow the federal policy to adopt longer limitation periods.' 7 The
v. Low, 478 F.2d 360, 366-67 (2d Cir. 1972); N.Y. CIV. PRAC. § 202 (McKinney 1972); cf.
Robertson v. Seidman & Seidman, 609 F.2d 583, 586 (2d Cir. 1979) (borrowing Alaska's two-
year limitation for injuries to persons or rights not arising from contract). See, e.g., lIT v.
Cornfeld, 619 F.2d 909, 928 (2d Cir. 1980) (applying New York common law fraud period);
Phillips v. Levie, 593 F.2d 459, 460-61 (2d Cir. 1979); Stull v. Bayard, 561 F.2d 429, 431-32 (2d
Cir. 1977); Klein v. Shields & Co., 470 F.2d 1344, 1346 (2d Cir. 1972); Klein v. Auchincloss,
Parker & Redpath, 436 F.2d 339, 341 (2d Cir. 1971); Fischman v. Raytheon Mfg. Co., 188 F.2d
783, 787 (2d Cir. 1951) (fraud statute chosen without discussion); Block & Barton supra note
10, at 376 & 383 (no blue sky period in New York); cf. Berry Petroleum Co. v. Adams &
Peck, 518 F.2d 402, 408 (2d Cir. 1975) (applying Texas blue sky limitation period).
In addition to New York's six-year common law fraud limitation period, the Second Cir-
cuit has considered New York's three-year limitation for liability created by statute except
otherwise provided and New York's ten-year period applicable to general equity actions oc-
curring before 1962. See Klein v. Bower, 421 F.2d 338, 343 & n.4 (2d Cir. 1970) (applying
3-year limitation period to claim not stated as violation of rule 10b-5 and leaving issue open
whether same limitation period might apply to 10b-5 action).
10, See text accompanying notes 102-08 infra.
102 619 F.2d 909 (2d Cir. 1980). The appellant trust in IT brought suit under rule lOb-5
against the issuer of publicly traded common stock and of a convertible note of a private cor-
poration for aiding and abetting against the trust's security broker. 619 F.2d at 913.
Although the district court never reached the statute of limitation issue, the Second Circuit
held that the applicable statute of limitations had not run and thus did not bar the action.
See id. at 929; text accompanying notes 103-04 infra.
. 619 F.2d at 928 (following Stull v. Bayard, 561 F.2d 429, 431 (2d Cir. 1977) and
Phillips v. Levie, 593 F.2d 459, 462 (2d Cir. 1979)). In Phillips v. Levie, the Second Circuit ac-
cepted the lower court's determination that New York's fraud statute of limitations applied
to a 10b-5 action. See 593 F.2d at 462 & n.12. Similarly, the Stull v. Bayard court did not
analyze the reason for applying New York's fraud statute to an action brought under § 14 of
the '34 Act other than to conclude summarily that the statute was most closely analogous to
federal statute. See 561 F.2d at 431-32 & 432 n.3 (reference to rule 10b-5 cases).
104 See N.Y. CiV. PRAC. LAW § 213(8) (McKinney) (six years from the discovery of fraud
or from the time plaintiff could have discovered fraud with reasonable diligence).
"05 See N.Y. CIv. PRAC. LAW § 203(f) (McKinney) (two years from discovery of facts of
action or from time when plaintiff could have discovered facts). The IT court construed sec-
tions 203(f) and 213(8) to have the combined effect of alternative and separately timed limita-
tions. 619 F.2d at 928-29; see Phillips v. Levie, 593 F.2d 459, 462 n.12; note 104 supra.
" See 619 F.2d at 928.
107 See Berry Petroleum Co. v. Adams & Peck, 518 F.2d 402, 408-09 (2d Cir. 1975). Ap-
pellants were a class of owners of certain stock who sued under rule 10b-5 alleging that of-
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circuit reasoned that a statute with a longer limitation period best im-
plements the goals of 10b-5, especially when the statute provides a
broader cause of action for buyers than rule 10b-5 provides."'
III. CIRCUIT COURTS PROVIDING NO CLEAR RULE
The First Circuit has never addressed the issue of which statute to
apply for the limitation of 10b-5 actions."9 Similarly, the Third Circuit
ficers and directors of the issuing corporation fraudulently caused shareholders to approve
a merger. Id. at 405-06. The action in Berry Petroleum Co. originated in the Northern
District of Texas, but the Judicial Panel of Multidistrict Litigation transferred the case to
the Southern District of New York. See id. New York's borrowing statute thus required the
Second Circuit to apply the appropriate state law of Texas since Texas was the forum. See
id. at 406-09; NEW YORK CIV. PRACT. § 202. The Berry Petroleum Co. court attempted to
determine which Texas state cause of action was most similar to the federal cause of action
under rule 10b-S. See 518 F.2d at 407. The court in Berry Petroleum Co. compared the
three-year Texas blue sky statute of limitations with the Texas statute of limitations for
fraud by misrepresentation. See id.; TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. 1948, art. 581-33 (3-year blue sky
limitation); TEX. REV. CODE ANN. tit. § 27.01(a) (Vernon) (court-defined 2-year limitation
period for fraud).
Analyzing the differences between the blue sky statute and 10b-5, the Second Circuit
found unimportant that the blue sky statute provided a right of action only for buyers
because the plaintiffs were buyers. Id. The court also found unimportant that the blue sky
statute imposed a duty of care on the purchaser since courts often have interpreted 10b-5 to
include this duty. See id. Significantly, the court did not emphasize that the blue sky statute
did not require scienter even though many courts required proof of some degree of scienter
in 10b-5 actions. See id.; cf. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193 (1976) (scienter
required for 10(b) action). The blue sky statute additionally did not require reliance. See 518
F.2d at 409. Finally, both the blue sky statute and rule 10b-5 limited recovery to out-of-
pocket or rescission damages.
The differences between the general business fraud statute and 10b-5 included a lack of
an expressed scienter requirement in the Texas statute.Id. at 408. Since some Texas decisions
have required common law fraud scienter or intent, however, the Berry Petroleum Co.
court found the Texas fraud statute narrower than the blue sky statute. Id. at 409. The
fraud statute required reliance by the purchaser, which the United States Supreme Court
held not required in certain rule 10b-5 actions based on nondisclosure. See id.; Affiliated Ute
Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 153-54 (1972). The fraud statute also permitted a
plaintiff to recover the difference between the represented and actual values. See id.
In view of the differences between the fraud statute and rule 10b-5, therefore, the court
agreed with the district court that the Texas blue sky statute was more similar to the rule
10b-5 cause of action than the general business fraud statute. See id. at 408; TEX. REV Civ.
STAT. 1948, art. 581-33 (3-year blue sky period). Since the Texas general business fraud
statute in Berry Petroleum Co. implied a two-year limitation period, the choice of such
statute instead of the longer three-year blue sky period also would violate federal securities
fraud policy in favor of longer limitation periods. See id. Furthermore, when a plaintiff
satisfies the substantive elements of rule lOb-5 and also would have a timely cause of action
under the state blue sky statute, federal policy should not support barring the plaintiff from
federal court because of the applicable limitation period. See 518 F.2d at 409. This situation
could result if the limitation period for 10b-5 were the shorter fraud period. See id.
108 See note 107 supra.
See Barton & Block, supra note 10, at 376 & n.17. In Janigan v. Taylor, sellers of
stock alleged that the defendants made false representations at a directors' meeting concern-
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has not clearly defined which state statutes will provide the 10b-5
statute of limitation.11 Although the Third Circuit recently has applied
statutory common law fraud limitation periods in New Jersey"' and
twice in Pennsylvania,"' no Third Circuit decision has squarely addressed
the limitation issue in the situation where a buyer of securities has sued
ing future prospects of the company. See 344 F.2d 781, 783 (1st Cir. 1965). The First Circuit
held that Massachusetts' personal tort statute applied to securities fraud, but the court failed
to compare the state blue sky statute or any other statute with the personal tort statute.
See id. at 783; Barton & Block, supra note 10, at 376 n.17. In 1978, the First Circuit followed
Janigan, but did not discuss the decision. See Cook v. Avien, 573 F.2d 685, 694 (1st Cir. 1978)
(applying Massachusetts 2-year personal tort statute to federal securities fraud actions).
The fact that the personal tort limitation period and the'blue sky period were both two
years may explain the absence of discussion in Cook of the Janigan court's choice of limita-
tion period statutes. See 573 F.2d at 694; Dyer v. Eastern Trust and Banking Co., 336 F.
Supp. 890, 906 n.22 (N.D. Me. 1971).
11 See text accompanying notes 111-18 infra.
1 See Roberts v. Magnetic Metals Co., 611 F.2d 450 (3d Cir. 1979). In Magnetic Metals
Co., the plaintiff/seller of stock alleged material misrepresentations and omissions in connec-
tion with a freezeout merger proposed by defendant majority shareholder evaluated by
defendant broker. Id. at 452-53. By a divided panel, the court held that New Jersey's six-
year limitation for common law fraud, and not the state's two-year blue sky limitation
period applied to the 10b-5 action. See 611 F.2d at 452, 456 (Gibbons, J., opinion of the court),
460 (Sloviter, J., concurring); N.J. REv. STAT. § 2A:14-1 (Supp. 1979) (6-year fraud period);
N.J. REV. STAT. § 49:3:71(e) (1979 Supp.) (2-year blue sky period). Since New Jersey's blue
sky statute afforded a remedy to buyers but not sellers, the Magnetic Metals Co. court
reasoned that the general fraud statute would govern the seller's complaint if brought in
state court, and that the same fraud statute should govern a 10b-5 action arising in New
Jersey. 611 F.2d at 453-55; see N.J. REv. STAT. § 49:3:71(a) (1979 Supp). See generally Doret
& Fiebach, supra note 3, at 862-66.
The concurrence in Magnetic Metals Co. agreed with the opinion of the court to the ex-
tent that the blue sky law lacked a remedy for the seller, but urged that under other cir-
cumstances the New Jersey blue sky limitation period would best comport with federal
policy. See id. at 458 (Sloviter, J., concurring). Chief Judge Seitz dissented, arguing that the
court should first choose the state statute most analogous substantively to rule 10b-5, and
apply the limitation period for that statute if the application would promote the federal
policy against securities fraud. See id. at 461-63 (Seitz, C.J., dissenting). The dissent main-
tained the shorter blue sky period would promote federal policy by alerting other
shareholders of the misconduct earlier, by permitting management to confidently proceed
with the assurance that transactions are safe from attack, and by promoting greater stability
in securities markets. See id at 463. According to Seitz, the court should have applied the
blue sky period since in addition to promoting federal policy, the blue sky statute, § 10(b)
and rule 10b-5 all regulate the sale of securities and prohibit similar conduct. See id.
"' See Sharp v. Coopers & Lybrand, 649 F.2d 175 (3d Cir.), cert. denied 102 S. Ct. 1427
(1981); Biggans v. Bache Halsey Stuart Shields, 638 F.2d 605 (3d Cir. 1980). In Biggans, the
plaintiff maintained a discretionary trading account with defendant broker. See 38 F.2d at
606. Plaintiff alleged that his account executive excessively traded from plaintiff's account
solely to create commissions in violation of § 10(b) and rule 10b-5. See id. at 606-07. The
court applied the six-year statute applicable to common law fraud and breach of fiduciary
duty actions, and not the one-year blue sky statute of limitations. 638 F.2d at 608, 610; see
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 31 (six-year common law fraud period), repealed by act of July 9,
1976, Act No. 142, 1976, Act No. 142, 1976 PA. LAWS 586 (codified at 42 PA. CONST. STAT.
App. § 5521-5536 (1978) (Judicial Code) (creating 2-year limitation period for taking, detain-
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a fraudulent seller.113 All of the Third Circuit cases that did apply the
common law period reasoned that the fraud statutes would govern the
plaintiffs' causes of action if brought under state law."' Since the blue
sky laws would not have governed plaintiffs' causes of action if brought
in state court, the common law fraud limitation periods governed the 10b-5
actions in questions."' Recently, however, the Eastern District of Penn-
sylvania"1 addressed the 10b-5 limitation issue of buyer suing seller and
held the blue sky limitation period applicable notwithstanding the Third
Circuit precedent applying common law fraud periods, since the plaintiff
would have an action if brought under state law.' 7 The implication,
therefore, is that the Third Circuit will apply the blue sky limitation
period in 10b-5 actions where the buyer has sued the seller of securities,
ing, or injuring personal property, and 6-year catch-all provision); id. tit. 70, § 1-501 (Purdon
Supp. 1980) (blue sky period of one year after actual or constructive notice and 3 years after
the act or transaction). The Biggans court did not decide whether the newly created Judicial
Code replaced the 6-year common law fraud period with a 6-year catch-all statute or with a
2-year statute for taking;detaining or injuring personal property. See 638 F.2d at 607 n.2. In
the event the six-year period had been shortened to two years, an issue not yet decided by
Pennsylvania courts, the transition section of the Judicial Code, § 25(a), permitted an extra
year in addition to the repealed limitation period to bring the action. See id.; 42 PA. CONST.
STAT. App. § 25(a) (1978).
Since Pennsylvania's blue sky statute provided a remedy only for buyers and sellers, a
divided panel in Biggans held that only buyers and sellers could sue under the blue sky law
if the action was brought in state court. See 638 F.2d at 606, 609-10; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 70, §
1-501 (Purdon). Section 1-501 of Pennsylvania's blue sky laws creates express liability for
sellers and buyers and provides the only possible source of civil liability for any violation of
the Pennsylvania blue sky laws encompassing churning. See 638 F.2d at 609; PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 70, §§ 1-401, -403, -404 (Purdon). Section 1-501, however, creates no liability for churning.
Following Magnetic Metals Co., the Third Circuit therefore held the common law fraud
limitation applicable to the rule 10b-5 action since the same fraud statute would control the
churning cause of action if brought under state law. 638 F.2d at 608, 610. The Third Circuit
vacated the summary judgment granted to the defendant since the applicable limitation
period of six years did not bar plaintiffs 10b-5 cause of action. Id. at 608, 611; see Doret &
Fiebach, supra note 3, at 883 (editor's note).
In Sharp v. Coopers & Lybrand, plaintiff was a purchaser of limited partnership in-
terests who invested on the basis of misleading accounting firm letters. See 649 F.2d 175
(3rd Cir. 1981). The Third Circuit ruled that the six-year statute of limitation for common
law fraud was applicable to the purchaser's 10b-5 cause of action. Id. at 191-92. Following
Biggans and Magnetic Metals Co., the court reasoned that the most analogous state action
would be for common law fraud because the defendant was not a seller. See id. Hence the
applicable limitation period from the common law fraud statute applied. Id.
" See Biggans v. Bache Halsey Stuart Shields, 638 F.2d 605, 612 (3d Cir. 1980) (Seitz,
C.J., dissenting) (recognizing inconsistent decisions in the Third Circuit); Goodman v.
Moyer, 523 F. Supp. 35, 38 (E.D. Pa. 1981) (Biggans leaves no clear rule); notes 111-12 supra.
114 See notes 111-12 supra.
11 See id.
See Goodman v. Moyer, 523 F. Supp. 35 (E.D. Pa. 1981); text accompanying note 117
infra.
"I See 523 F. Supp. at 38 (E.D. Pa. 1981). In Goodman, the plaintiff shareholder alleged
that the issuing corporation provided misinformation for the plaintiff so that plaintiff relin-
quished his right to purchase certain stocks at a favorable price. See id. at 36-37. The Good-
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because such claims if brought in state court would be governed by the
blue sky statutes in states within the Third Circuit."'
The Fifth Circuit applies a state by state approach in determining
which limitation period applies to 10b-5 actions."9 In Wood v. Combus-
tion,"' the Fifth Circuit applied Texas' common law fraud limitation
period 2' rather than the unusually longer blue sky period. '22 The Wood
court refused to consider the federal policy of applying longer limitation
periods to federal actions." Rather, the Fifth Circuit looked only to the
state cause of action bearing the closest substantive resemblance to
10b-5 actions."4 In White v. Sanders," however, the Fifth Circuit applied
Alabama's blue sky limitation period".. to a 10b-5 action." The White
man court squarely decided the limitation issue where the plaintiff has a cause of action
under the applicable blue sky statute were the action brought in state court. See id. at 38.
The court found the elements of proof of the blue sky statute to be the same as the elements
of a 10b-5 cause of action. Id. at 38-39; accord, Ritt v. Thriving Enterprises Ltd. No. 80-4953,
slip op. at 15-16 (E.D. Pa. September 18, 1981). Thus the Pennsylvania blue sky statute was
most analogous to rule 10b-5. 523 F. Supp. at 38; see 70 PA. STAT. ANN. §§ 1-401, -501, -504
(Purdon 1980). Accordingly, the Goodman court held Pennsylvania's one-year blue sky
limitation period applicable and denied defendant's summary judgment motion, ruling that
the limitation period did not bar the action. See 523 F. Supp. at 39.
,,I See 523 F. Supp. at 39; cf. text accompanying notes 116-17 supra.
' See text accompanying notes 120-30 infra.
120 643 F.2d 339 (5th Cir. 1981). In Wood v. Combustion, former shareholders of
American Pole Structures Corporation exchanged their stock for Combustion Engineering,
Inc. stock in a merger between a subsidiary of Combustion and American Pole. See id. at
341. Plaintiffs alleged that defendant Combustion fraudulently induced plaintiffs to make
the exchange. See id. The court held that'the three-year Texas common law fraud statute of
limitations barred the 10b-5 action. Id. at 346-47.
" See 643 F.2d at 342 n.5 (2-year period determined by court holding, not statute);
TEX. Bus. & COMM. CODE § 27.01 (1968) (general business fraud).
" See 643 F.2d at 342 n.6, 346;.TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. 1948, art. 581-33 (1964) (3-year blue
sky law); cf. 643 F.2d at 345 & n.12 (issue left open as to federal action accruing after 1977
amendment of blue sky law).
'" See 643 F.2d at 344 & n.1l (court recognizing speculative process of choosing 10b-5
limitation period); cf. Berry Petroleum Co. v. Adams, & Peck, 518 F.2d 402, 409 (2d Cir.
1975); Robert v. Magnetic Metals Co., 611 F.2d 450, 463 (3d Cir. 1979) (Seitz, C.J.,
dissenting).
,U See 643 F.2d at 344. The Wood court specifically looked for the reliance and scienter
elements in the state cause of action to determine which state statute most closely resembled a
10b-5 action. See id. at 345; TEx. Bus. & COMM. CODE § 27.01(1)(B). Since the Texas blue sky
law does not require reliance or scienter, the Wood court applied the common law fraud
limitations period. 643 F.2d at 345; see TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. 1948, art. 581-33 (1964).
'7 650 F.2d 627 (5th Cir. 1981). In White v. Sanders, the defendant sold securities to
plaintiffs without informing the purchasers that he received compensation for selling the
securities. See id. at 628. Plaintiffs would not have sold but for the defendants activities.
See id.; text accompanying note 127 infra.
' See ALA. CODE § 8-6-19(e) (1975) (2-year blue sky period); cf. id. § 6-2-39 (1975) (one-
year catch-all provision, applicable to common law fraud, 650 F.2d at 629).
I' 650 F.2d at 633. The Alabama blue sky statute in White did not require scienter. See
650 F.2d at 629 & n.3, 630; ALA. CODE § 8-6-19(a)(2). The court nonetheless found that the
blue sky statute bore a closer resemblance to rule 10b-5 than did the catch-all statute. See
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court placed primary importance on the commonality of purpose be-
tween rule 10b-5 and the state statute chosen to provide the limitation
period. '28 The court distinguished Wood v. Combustion simply because
the Texas fraud statute resembled rule 10b-5 more than the Alabama
counterpart resembled 10b-5. 29 In view of Wood and White, the Fifth
Circuit thus has provided no clear guidance regarding the proper limita-
tion other than to predict a state by state analysis of which law bears the
closest resemblance to rule 10b-5.1 30
IV. UNSETTLED STATE OF THE LAW
All of the circuits try to choose the 10b-5 limitation period from the
state statute which best effects the federal policy. 31 Yet circuits differ in
how to define the federal policy. 3 ' Circuit courts favoring the statutory
common law fraud period generally reason that the federal remedial
policy of the securities laws favors longer not shorter statutes of limita-
tion. Many circuits claim that choosing the state statute which most
closely resembles rule 10b-5 best effects federal policy. These circuits
also differ, however, in the emphasis of the analysis to determine the
statute bearing the closest resemblance. Circuits favoring blue sky laws
emphasize the commonality of purpose between the blue sky laws and
rule 10b-5. Circuits favoring fraud periods often distinguish the blue sky
laws from rule 10b-5 by emphasizing the substantive differences in
defenses or remedies.
The Ninth Circuit, for example, has declared that longer, not shorter
650 F.2d at 630-31. The Fifth Circuit held that the blue sky statute of limitations bore a
closer substantive resemblance to rule 10b-5, and thus applied to the action. Id. at 629; see
note 121 supra.
See 650 F.2d at 632.
1 See id. at 632 n.6. The Fifth Circuit has decided several cases since White that
touched on the 10b-5 limitation issue, but none have provided much guidance. See Summer
v. Land & Leisure, Inc., Nos. 79-2429, 80-5297, slip. op. at 13855, 13857 (5th Cir. December
28, 1981) (not deciding which Florida statute applies to 10b-5 action because the longest
statute barred the action); Putnam v. Williams, 652 F.2d 497, 502 & n.4 (5th Cir. 1981) (apply-
ing Georgia's two-year blue sky limitation without discussion of fraud limitation period);
First Federal Savings and Loan v. Mortgage Corp., 650 F.2d 1376, 1378 (5th Cir. 1981);
McNeal v. Paine, Webber, Jackson & Webber, Inc., 598 F.2d 888, 892-93 (5th Cir. 1979) (ap-
plying Georgia's four-year fraud statute to 10b-5 cause of action alleging churning); Nortek,
Inc. v. Alexander Grant & Co., 532 F.2d 1013, 1015 (5th Cir. 1976) (applying Florida's 2-year
blue sky statute to action brought under § 17 of '33 Act by purchaser of corporation against
accounting firm hired by seller), cert. denied 429 U.S. 1042 (1977); Byrne v. Gulfstream First
Bank & Trust Co., [1982] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 98,392 at 97,372 (S.D. Fla. December 21,
1981) (applying Florida's 2-year blue sky limitation period to 10b-5 action brought by plain-
tiff bank customer against defendant to whom bank transferred plaintiff's securities).
"3 See text accompanying notes 120-29 supra.
131 See Barton & Block, supra note 10, at 375; Doret & Fiebach, supra note 3, at 854.
See text accompanying notes 7-10 and 13-16 supra & 133-164 infra.
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limitation periods best effect federal securities law policies. 33 Accordingly,
the Ninth Circuit has consistently applied the typically longer common
law fraud limitation periods.13 ' The Fourth Circuit, which has applied
blue sky periods to 10b-5 limitation actions, places importance on Con-
gress' preference for shorter limitations in private civil suits under the
federal securities laws.1 31 Similarly, the Third Circuit notes a strong
federal interest in requiring a plaintiff to file suit quickly.' 3' The Second
Circuit, however, applied through its borrowing statute a blue sky
period rather than an unusually shorter fraud statute and reasoned that
longer limitation periods best serve the broad remedial policies of
federal securities laws.1 37 The Seventh Circuit has applied blue sky
periods in each state within the Circuit, but has avoided consideration of
federal policy.
138
The Sixth Circuit decisions illustrate the uncertainty regarding the
proper federal policy for 10b-5 limitation periods. The Nickels v. Koehler
Management Corp.'3 and IDS Progressive Fund v. First of Michigan
Corp. ° decisions both relied on the federal policy to apply longer limita-
tion periods."' In Carothers v. Rice,"' however, the Sixth Circuit ex-
plained that the real purpose behind the federal policy for longer limita-
tion periods is to allow the plaintiff in federal court at least the same
time to sue as that plaintiff would have in state court.4 3 Moreover, since
the requirements for both the blue sky statute and rule 10b-5 are relaxed
compared to a common law suit for misrepresentation, the price exacted
for the relaxed requirements is a shortened statute of limitation.'44 If the
" See United California Bank v. Salik, 481 F.2d 1012, 1015 (9th Cir. 1973); text accom-
panying notes 83-89 supra.
"* See text accompanying notes 83-90 supra.
' See Fox v. Kane-Miller, 542 F.2d 915, 918 (4th Cir. 1976); text accompanying notes
68-73 supra.
'" See Roberts v. Magnetic Metals Co., 611 F 2d 450, 463 (3d Cir. 1979) (Seitz, C.J.,
dissenting); note 111 supra.
"' See notes 107-08 supra.
"' See text accompanying notes 55-63 supra. In Parrent, the Seventh Circuit described
the federal policy of securities laws as protection for the gullible and uninformed. 455 F.2d
at 126; see text accompanying notes 51-57 supra.
'.. 541 F.2d 611 (6th Cir. 1976); see note 74 supra. Some decisions have placed importance
on the federal policy for continuing the application of the statutory period earlier established.
This stare decisis notion allows the general investing public to rely on a previously
established limitation period. See, e.g., Nickels v. Koehler Management, 541 F.2d 611, 618
(6th Cir. 1976); Clegg v. Conk, 507 F.2d 1351, 1353 (10th Cir. 1974); cf. McNeal v. Paine, Web-
ber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc., 598 F.2d 888, 892-93 n.9 (5th Cir. 1979) (movement in 10b-5
limitation period up and down like a yo-yo is unavoidable side effect of applying state limita-
tion periods).
,' 533 F.2d 340 (6th Cir. 1976); see note 78 supra.
See 541 F.2d at 614, 618; 533 F.2d at 344.
"' 633 F.2d 7 (6th Cir. 1980); see text accompanying notes 76-81 supra.
See 633 F.2d at 14.
'" Id. But see Berry Petroleum Co. v. Adams & Peck, 518 F.2d 402, 409 (2d Cir. 1975)
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blue sky law provides the only state cause of action, therefore, the
shorter blue sky limitation period would serve federal policy.'
Just as some circuits disagree regarding the proper federal policy,
other circuits differ with respect to analyses of substantive provisions
contained in the state statutes at issue. 4' Typically the court chooses
between the blue sky and common law fraud statutes, and the court
must determine which statute most resembles rule 10b-5.'47 The analyses
diverge, however, in determining which factors are important in the
comparison. In Forrestal Village, Inc. v. Graham,4' for example, the
District of Columbia Circuit's analysis of the substantive provisions of
D.C. and federal statutes placed emphasis on the commonality of pur-
pose between rule 10b-5 and the D.C. blue sky law."4 The Forrestal
Village, Inc. court found unimportant that the D.C. blue sky law, unlike
rule 10b-5, does not require scienter, since the blue sky law, like rule
10b-5, directly regulates the sale of securities."' Similarly, the Eighth
Circuit has applied the blue sky limitation period even though the blue
sky law does not require scienter. 5' In Morris v. Stife Nicolaus & Co.,
Inc."' the Eighth Circuit emphasized the important connection between
the blue sky provisions and rule 10b-5 as the common purpose of
regulating the sale of securities."3 The Tenth Circuit, by contrast, em-
phasized the scienter requirement of a common law fraud action as
reason for choosing the common law fraud period rather than the blue
sky period. 54 Generally, the circuits favoring blue sky periods rely on
the commonality of purpose rationale, while circuits favoring common
law fraud periods often emphasize the substantive differences between
blue sky laws and rule 10b-5.
Rather than relying on a rationale such as commonality of purpose
or the importance of scienter or other elements in the state statute,
some decisions emphasize whether the plaintiff would have a cause of ac-
(Second Circuit prefers to apply stricter statute with shorter limitation period); text accom-
panying note 117 supra.
See 622 F.2d at 14.
148 See text accompanying notes 147-54 infra. Compare Wood v. Combustion, 643 F.2d
339, 346 (5th Cir. 1981) (applying Texas common law fraud period) with Berry Petroleum Co.
v. Adams & Peck, 518 F.2d 402, 409 (2d Cir. 1975) (applying Texas blue sky period).
"' See text accompanying note 10 supra; cf. A. JACOBS, supra note 6, at 10-14 to 10-15
(other statutes); text accompanying notes 126-27 supra (catch-all statute).
551 F.2d 411 (D.C. Cir. 1977); see text accompanying notes 61-65 supra.
4 551 F.2d at 414; note 150 infra.
" See 551 F.2d at 414. The Forrestal Village, Inc. court found that the commonality of
purpose to outweigh the differences between the blue sky law and rule 10b-5. See id.
"' See Morris v. Stifel, Nicolaus & Co., Inc., 600 F.2d 139, 146 (8th Cir. 1979); text ac-
companying notes 126-27 supra & 152-53 infra.
"' 600 F.2d 139 (8th Cir. 1979); see text accompanying notes 48-50 supra.
See 600 F.2d at 144.
"5 See Mitchell v. Texas Gulf Sulphur, 446 F.2d 90, 104 (10th Cir. 1971); text accompa-
nying notes 93-96 supra.
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tion in state court under the state statutes at issue."' In Roberts v.
Magnetic Metals,"6 the Third Circuit refused to apply the blue sky
limitation period because the blue sky law did not provide a remedy for
plaintiff sellers."7 For the 10b-5 plaintiff to sue in state court, the plain-
tiff would need to bring action under the common law fraud statute."'
Therefore the common law fraud limitation period applied to the 10b-5
action. 5 In O'Hara v. Kovens,"' the Fourth Circuit regarded as unimpor-
tant the absence of any civil remedy for sellers in the blue sky law.'61 The
O'Hara court applied the blue sky limitation period since blue sky laws
protect sellers' rights. '62 In Carothers v. Rice, 6' the Sixth Circuit implied
a remedy for sellers under blue sky laws and then applied the blue sky
limitation period.' Normally, the circuits favoring statutory common
law fraud periods for 10b-5 actions will support the choice of the fraud
statute when possible by noting that the plaintiff could not bring action
under the state's blue sky law.
The inconsistent results among the circuits provide no rational ex-
planation for federal courts continuously comparing and contrasting
state statutes with rule 10b-5. Aside from the esoteric comparisons of
substantive statutory provisions, federal courts cannot agree on what
the policy of rule 10b-5 is.'6 ' A comparison of the Second Circuit's Berry
Petroleum Co. v. Adams & Peck'66 and the Fifth Circuit's Wood v. Com-
bustion'67 decisions further demonstrates the lack of consistency in the
process of selecting proper limitation periods for 10b-5 actions.' 6 The
issue in both decisions was whether the Texas blue sky statute or com-
mon law fraud statute would determine the limitation period of 10b-5 ac-
tions.' 9 Through New York's borrowing statute, the Second Circuit in
Berry Petroleum Co. applied the three year Texas blue sky period.' 6 In
Wood, however, the Fifth Circuit applied the two-year Texas common
law fraud period."'
' See text accompanying notes 156-64 infra.
£1 611 F.2d 450 (3d Cir. 1979); see note 111 supra.
"' See 611 F.2d at 453, 455-56.
'1 See id. at 453.
1' Id.
' 625 F.2d 15 (4th Cir. 1980), see text accompanying notes 68-73 supra.
See 625 F.2d at 17-18.
See 625 F.2d at 17-18. Although the blue sky law provided no civil remedy for the
plaintiff, the 0'H-ara court supported the blue sky limitation because the blue sky law pro-
vided express criminal liability of defrauding buyers. See id.
' ' 633 F.2d 7 (6th Cir. 1980); see text accompanying notes 76-81 supra.
'" See 633 F.2d at 12-14.
'' See text accompanying notes 166-75 infra.
' 518 F.2d 402 (2d Cir. 1975); see text accompanying notes 107-08 supra.
'6, 643 F.2d 339 (5th Cir. 1981); see text accompanying notes 121-24 supra.
" See text accompanying notes 169-75 infra.
,' See 643 F.2d at 342; 518 F.2d at 406.
,o See 518 F.2d at 409; 643 F.2d at 346.
' See 643 F.2d at 346; 518 F.2d at 409.
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The factors the court chose to emphasize provided the primary dif-
ference in the analyses in Berry Petroleum Co. and Wood."2 Both the
Second and Fifth Circuits engaged in a detailed inquiry of the specific
language and substance of the statutes.' The Second Circuit, however,
chose to emphasize the federal policies involved,' while the Fifth Cir-
cuit emphasized only the resemblance to rule 10b-5. ' In Berry
Petroleum Co., the Second Circuit examined the substantive provisions
of both Texas statutes, compared each statute to rule 10b-5, and found
the blue sky law most similar to rule 10b-5.Y11 The court recognized that
the blue sky law had no reliance or scienter elements. 7 Since federal
policy preferred longer limitation periods and since the language of the
blue sky law more nearly approximated rule 10b-5, however, the court
applied the blue sky period.'78 In Wood, the Fifth Circuit expressly refused
to speculate on what the broad remedial purposes of rule 10b-5 are.'79 In-
stead, the court examined only the substantive provisions of the Texas
statutes to determine which statute most closely resembled rule 10b-5."'
The two major factors the Wood decision used to apply the common law
fraud statute were that the Texas blue sky law did not contain the
elements of scienter and reliance."'
As the Fifth Circuit in Wood recognized, the practice of looking to
the law of the forum state to determine the limitation period for 10b-5
actions forces a court to make esoteric inquiries.8 ' The court noted the
abstruseness of the questions involved and stated that the 10b-5 cases
applying Texas statutes alone are entirely irreconcilable."3 Moreover,
the Wood decision recommended congressional enactment of a section 10
statute of limitation."4
V. PROPOSED SOLUTION
Some courts have proposed the adoption of a one year from
discovery limitation provision such as in the American Law Institute's
Proposed Federal Securities Code"' (Federal Securities Code). The
172 See text accompanying notes 173-75 infra.
See 643 F.2d at 344-46; 518 F.2d at 407-09.
'.. See 518 F.2d at 409.
171 See 643 F.2d at 344 & n.11.
See 518 F.2d at 407-09.
'7 See id. at 409.
' See id.
9 See 643 F.2d at 344 & n.11.
187 See id. at 344-45.
181 See id. at 345; note 107 supra.
182 See 643 F.2d at 342.
1 See id. at 343.
184 See id. at 342.
18 FEDERAL SECURITIES CODE, Proposed Official Draft (March 15, 1978); see McNeal v.
Paine Webber Jackson and Curtis, 598 F.2d 888, 892 (5th Cir. 1979); note 129 supra.
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Federal Securities Code integrates and arguably simplifies six federal
statutes that Congress enacted between 1933 and 1940,86 including the
'34 Act.8 ' Parts sixteen and seventeen of the Federal Securities Code
gather all the fraud provisions from throughout the various federal
statutes.'88 Part sixteen contains the substantive aspects of rule 10b-5,
and part seventeen prescribes express liability for 10b-5 and other fraud
violations.8 '
Section 1727 of the Federal Securities Code provides a limitation
period for the code's express private actions and for actions implied in
the future.'8 ' Section 1727 proscribes actions one year from the date the
plaintiff discovered or should have discovered the fraud."' The section
also implements an absolute five-year cut-off from the time the action ac-
crued.' 2 Furthermore, a new provision unknown to existing securities
laws permits a defendant to cut short the limitation period if under cer-
tain circumstances he offers to effect a rescission.' 3
The section 1727 limitation was a compromise between the typically
short limitation periods expressed in the Securities Act of 1933 and the
longer state statutory periods which federal courts borrow from the
forum state in rule 10b-5 actions. 4 Commentators, however, have
criticized relying on the Federal Securities Code as a solution to the
10b-5 limitation issue."5 The main criticism is that the Congress may not
enact the Federal Securities Code regardless of how preferable section
1727 is for 10b-5 actions.'" Congress is more likely to pass the Code,
however, because the SEC has officially endorsed the Federal Securities
Code."' Additionally, commentators have expressed concern that the
federal tolling doctrine will conflict with the code's automatic cut-off
date."' The federal tolling doctrine requires courts to toll the limitation
'' See Cheek, Federal Securities Code, 7 SEC 163, 164 (1979) [hereinafter cited as
Cheek].
1" See ALI FED. SEC. CODE, at xvii (May 10, 1978) (Final Draft, as adopted by ALI)
[hereinafter cited as ALl].
'u See id. Introduction at xlii-liii; Cheek, supra note 186, at 169.
'8 See ALI, supra note 187, Introduction, at xlv-xlvii. The Federal Securities Code's
commentators recognized that Congress gave no thought to civil liability under section
10(b). See id. Introduction, at xliv. Congress thus could not have anticipated a statute of
limitations. The commentators also found the lack of a federal limitation period for section
10(b) a cause of the wasteful litigation. See id. Introduction, at xliv-xlv.
See id. Introduction, at xlvi; § 1727.
"' ALI, supra note 187, at § 1727(b)(1).
Id. at § 1727(b)(2).
Id. at § 1727(g).
18 See id. Introduction, at liii; Martin, supra note 6, at 456 & n.93.
", See Barton & Block, supra note 10, at 384-85; Proposal For Congressional Legisla-
tion, supra note 1, at 1168.
'" See Barton & Block, supra note 10, at 385.
18 See note 203 infra.
, See Barton & Block, supra note 10, at 385 n.65; Proposal for Congressional Legisla-
tion, supra note 1, at 1168.
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period until the plaintiff discovers or reasonably should have discovered
the fraud or violation. ' The purpose of the federal tolling doctrine,
however, should be to serve the federal policy.2 0° If Congress defines that
policy in terms of the five-year absolute cut-off date, then courts should
abandon the tolling doctrine in 10b-5 actions.
2 0
,
The confusing patchwork in the law of federal 10b-5 actions is un-
necessary and wasteful. The simplest solution, of course, would be a con-
gressional amendment to the '34 Act specifying a limitations period.
Congress probably will not do this in the near future, however, because
of the impending legislation in the form of the ALI Federal Securities
Code.0 2 The SEC support for the code in general is an important factor
predicting the enactment of the code within the next few years.23 The
express SEC support for the section 1727 statute of limitation scheme in
particular suggests the likelihood for adoption of this Federal Securities
Code section in the event that Congress enacts only a part of the code.0 4
If no part of the code becomes law, Congress should then consider
separate enactment of a uniform limitation period for rule 10b-5. In view
of the support in the circuits and of the SEC, that uniform limitation
should track the section 1727 limitation scheme.
22
The solution to the rule 10b-5 limitation issue is to wait for congres-
sional approval of the Federal Securities Code. Admittedly, the section
1727 limitation period of one year with an absolute five-year cut-off is ar-
bitrary, and there exists an infinite variety of possible limitation
periods. The section 1727 period, however, is the product of years of
study that many distinguished scholars devoted to synthesizing the
Federal Securities Code. The SEC and scholarly backing of the Federal
Securities Code gives credence to the one and five year limitation period
and to the code in general. Therefore, the section 1727 period is currently
the best choice for the rule 10b-5 limitation.
GORDON W. STEWART
199 See Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392, 396 (1946); Proposal for Congressional
Legislation, supra note 1, at 1159-61.
See Martin, supra note 6, at 459.
201 See id.
292 See ALI, supra note 187.
, See SEC Release Nos. 33-6242 (Sept. 18, 1980), 33-6377 (Jan. 21, 1982). Although no
bill is currently pending in Congress, the SEC has twice officially recommended adoption of
the code, recognizing that such an enactment would promote greater predictability and cer-
tainty in the interpretation of the federal securities law in general. See id. No. 33-6242.
',' See id. No. 33-6242. While the SEC recommended revisions in the ALI Final Draft of
the code, the SEC expressly accepted as is the code's statute of limitation scheme. See id.
' See text accompanying notes 184-93 supra.
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